



Director of  
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## USSR-SYRIA-ISRAEL: Continuing Soviet Concern

*The USSR remains uneasy about the possibility of an Israeli attack on the SA-5 missile complexes in Syria as the air defense network there moves toward full operational status.*

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*Pravda's top Middle East commentator yesterday reiterated that Israel is preparing such an attack and claimed that the installation of the complexes is a "purely defensive move." The article, in warning of a wider conflict, added that the USSR's proposal for "joint collective actions" was the best way to normalize the situation in the Middle East.*

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
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Comment: The Soviet press coverage

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[redacted] suggest the USSR is concerned Israel might strike the SA-5 complexes before they and the supporting air defense network become fully operational. In raising the specter of a "wider conflict," Moscow is trying to deter Tel Aviv, as well as exploit the new Soviet military presence in the Middle East in order to support broader regional objectives. *Pravda* reminded all parties in the dispute that the USSR's interests be considered in any regional settlement. [redacted]

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ISRAEL: Growing Possibility of Election

*Support for an early election among Prime Minister Begin's coalition partners appears to be increasing.* [redacted]

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Press accounts state two small parties in the coalition--Agudat Israel and Tehiyya--have already agreed to a new election as a way of resolving the impasse over how to deal with Defense Minister Sharon. Tehiyya is said to have introduced a motion that it be held in November. The National Religious Party and TAMI reportedly are leaning toward supporting an early vote.

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Sharon, meanwhile, has continued his efforts to attract support in the Army and among coalition members. He reportedly rejected a compromise yesterday that would have given him a cabinet position as minister without portfolio if he agreed to step down as Defense Minister.

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The cabinet will meet again today to hear directly from senior Army officers. A vote on whether or not to accept the inquiry commission's recommendations is expected.

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Comment: The National Religious Party and TAMI both want Sharon ousted and may have softened their opposition to an early election in hopes of speeding his departure.

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## PAKISTAN-USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Status of UN Mediation

*Pakistani President Zia is optimistic that the USSR may alter its policy on Afghanistan, but the just-concluded round of UN-sponsored talks apparently achieved only slight progress and left key elements of a settlement untouched.* [redacted]

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Zia told a US Senator on Sunday there were "strong indications" the Soviets may soon change their stand on Afghanistan and could be willing to make changes in the government in Kabul. Other Pakistani officials, however, have assured the US Ambassador that Islamabad is sticking to its positions and will not be taken in by Soviet tactical maneuvers. [redacted]

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A Pakistani official involved in the talks says the parties have agreed in principle that the withdrawal of Soviet troops has to be completed within a specific time, that the Afghan refugees are to be consulted through some form of UN machinery, and that Pakistan has to provide specific guarantees of noninterference to meet Soviet concerns. Actual dates for a Soviet withdrawal were not discussed, and Moscow has not precisely defined what it considers interference. The Pakistanis deny there have been any significant discussions on the subject of a transition government. [redacted]

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Comment: Although the parties evidently have slightly narrowed their differences on the elements to be included in a political settlement, the UN effort could quickly stall when detailed negotiations begin. The refugees, who so far have publicly rejected the UN effort, will not agree to return to Afghanistan unless all elements of a settlement are acceptable to them.

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The Soviets probably would not agree to a timetable for withdrawal without assurances regarding the kind of government they will leave behind in Kabul. At this stage, they have shown little interest in anything but cosmetic changes to the Afghan regime. In addition, given the inability of any one party to control movement across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Islamabad will be unable to give the Soviets a credible guarantee of noninterference. [redacted]

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## CHAD: Dissident Preparations Continue

*The Libyan buildup of dissident forward bases in the north is accelerating and signs Tripoli is having difficulty turning the Chadians into a disciplined force.* [REDACTED]

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The US Embassy in N'Djamena reports tension in the south has eased somewhat. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] local police in the Central African Republic are concerned about large quantities of Libyan arms being smuggled into the country for the Chadian dissidents. [REDACTED]

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Habre has requested US and international aid for 7,000 Chadians expelled from Nigeria. The government is concerned that pro-Libyan dissidents will slip into Chad with the returnees. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Although Libyan leader Qadhafi is determined to overthrow Habre, his actions continue to be limited to building up and encouraging the dissidents rather than preparing for a direct Libyan incursion. The buildup of forward bases may be among the last preparations before the dissidents are to attack. When the buildup is completed, Qadhafi will be impatient for action by the dissidents. [REDACTED]

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Qadhafi probably will provide more aid to the dissidents if they overrun important positions. If the dissidents fail or if their factional squabbling continues, however, he may decide to intervene more directly again to overthrow Habre. [REDACTED]

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## USSR-CHINA: Visit of Influential Soviet

The US Embassy in Moscow has learned Aleksandr Bovin--an influential political writer for *Izvestiya* and a reputed consultant to General Secretary Andropov--was to leave yesterday for Beijing. He plans to stay a month while both sides are preparing for the next round of consultations scheduled to open in Moscow early next month. The Soviets recently showed renewed interest in resuming the border talks, but they also have indicated to the Chinese that negotiations on border troops may be more difficult than the Chinese earlier had been led to expect. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Bovin may serve as an informal channel for messages between senior leaders, and he may write news reports to prepare domestic audiences for possible Soviet moves at the talks in March. Bovin could, for example, hint that Moscow is interested in a package deal in which troop cuts would hinge on progress in easing the border dispute. In addition, he may sound out the Chinese on the results of Secretary of State Shultz's visit. [REDACTED]

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## MEXICO: Gaps in Foreign Financing

Mexico is requesting \$500 million from commercial banks to bridge a gap caused by delays in the \$5 billion loan package being arranged. The US Embassy reports initial disbursements, which were to be made in mid-January, probably will not be released until next month. As a result, Mexico is critically low on foreign reserves and has delayed the 10-percent payment of past due private-sector interest from 31 January to mid-February. According to the Embassy, bankers are unreceptive to the request for the emergency loan. [redacted]

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Comment: If Mexico cannot arrange the bridge loan, it will fall behind on public-sector interest payments, and past due private-sector debt payments--now over \$2 billion--will continue to mount. Even with the credit, the government will be able to pay public-sector interest for only about three weeks. Mexico City is unlikely to cut essential imports--now 50 percent below the level of 1982--to meet debt service obligations. [redacted]

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## NICARAGUA: Opposition's Boycott Continues

The opposition's Democratic Coordinating Board has refused to participate in a recent government-sponsored discussion of a draft law governing political parties in preparation for elections in 1985. The Coordinating Board will decide whether to participate in future discussion of the law when its delegation returns from its visits with government leaders in Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica. Other parties in the government coalition have criticized the draft law, and the Sandinistas again emphasized it is subject to modification. [redacted]

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Comment: The opposition is standing firm on its objection to participation in discussions of the draft law as long as the regime continues to censor its views in the public media. The Coordinating Board hopes its widely publicized trip, especially to Venezuela, will help put pressure on the Sandinistas to modify the law and relax the restrictions on political activity under the state of emergency. Although the Sandinistas are unlikely to allow the opposition any real access to power, criticism of the draft law by the opposition and by coalition parties has led the Sandinistas to hint they will make some concessions. [redacted]

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## NORTH KOREA: Reaction to Military Exercise

P'yongyang has increased its criticism of the US - South Korean military exercise--Team Spirit 83--following President Kim Il-song's declaration last week of a "semi - state of war." [redacted]

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[redacted] Both the Chinese and Soviets have provided unusually strong public support for North Korea's protest over Team Spirit 83. [redacted]

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Comment: North Korea probably hopes to revive international pressure for US troop withdrawals. The North Koreans also may hope to check recent trends favorable to South Korean President Chun, who has made some well-received gestures toward political liberalization, settled the aid issue with Japan, and received some flattering attention from the USSR and other Communist countries. In any event, continuing tension increases the possibility of firing incidents along the DMZ. [redacted]

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## CHINA: Comments on INF

At the meeting on Tuesday of the UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva, China's delegate warned that any agreement on INF resulting in the transfer of medium-range missiles from Europe to other areas would be harmful to world peace. He repeated China's proposal made last June that it would join the arms control process if the superpowers would agree to reduce their nuclear weapons and delivery systems by 50 percent.

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Comment: The warning refers to Soviet SS-20s and is Beijing's first public show of concern that an INF agreement might increase Soviet missile deployment in the Far East. Previously, Chinese media dismissed US and Soviet INF proposals as insincere propaganda. In view of the growing interest in arms control in Western Europe, Beijing wants to demonstrate its own support for the issue while discouraging any agreement that would strengthen the USSR's nuclear threat to China.

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## TAIWAN-US: Comment on Secretary of State's Trip

Taiwan Premier Sun Yun-hsuan publicly stated on Tuesday he is satisfied with the results of Secretary of State Shultz's trip to China, and he expressed optimism about the future of relations with the US. The media provided extensive, straightforward reporting of the visit but mainly replayed Western accounts of the discussions. The Foreign Ministry thus far has refrained from formal comment, and many senior leaders have not raised the trip with US representatives.

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Comment: The muted reaction is virtually unprecedented. It probably reflects the senior leadership's belief that the trip has not led to any improvement in relations with Beijing at Taipei's expense.

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## EC-US: Farm Trade Dispute

Discussions between the EC and the US on agricultural trade open today amid rising tensions over recent US sales of subsidized farm products to Egypt. At the EC Agricultural Council meeting early this week, member countries criticized the US sale of wheat flour to Egypt last month. EC Agricultural Commissioner Dalsager referred to the sale as the first step of a trade war, and a prepared French statement circulated at the meeting suggested the Community take "appropriate" measures to dissuade the US from further actions aimed at the EC. The EC plans to ask for GATT consultations with the US on the subsidy issue. [redacted]

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Comment: The French are the most bitter over the US flour sale, in part because France is the largest EC producer of wheat. West German opposition to US agricultural policies could intensify, however, if the US concludes negotiations with Egypt for the sale of dairy products. West Germany, along with France, is the EC's largest dairy producer. If the EC decides to retaliate, it probably would restrict US access to the lucrative EC market rather than risk a costly subsidy war over third-country markets. [redacted]

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## KAMPUCHEA: Military Developments

The US Embassy in Bangkok reports Vietnamese troops are still occupying Nong Chan, the large non-Communist resistance base destroyed 10 days ago, and that they probably are mining it to prevent its reconstruction. Senior Thai officials and resistance leaders believe the next target of the Vietnamese will be the non-Communist headquarters base at Ban Sa Ngae. [redacted]

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Comment: The non-Communists at Ban Sa Ngae would not be able to repel a Vietnamese assault. The Vietnamese could quickly mass troops, artillery, and armor from at least two divisions to attack the 4,000 resistance fighters defending the base. Another major defeat for the non-Communists would jeopardize their recruiting in Kampuchea and undermine their attempts to obtain additional international support. [redacted]

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## WARSAW PACT: Military Manpower Problems

The East German news service has announced a conference for delegates of premilitary youth education organizations was held in East Berlin late last year. The conference focused on "questions of political education" in "socialist" countries. All Warsaw Pact nations, except Romania, were represented. [redacted]

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Comment: The conference probably dealt with ways to encourage young men to pursue professional military careers, as well as with improving training, increasing social discipline, and better preparing young men for compulsory service. Several Warsaw Pact countries have long had trouble getting draftees to extend beyond their initial term. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are experiencing an increase in such problems, apparently because military service is becoming more unpopular and more attractive civilian opportunities are available. In East Germany an aggressive, compulsory program aimed at stimulating enthusiasm among young people for military careers has instead provoked resistance among some young people, their parents, and religious authorities. [redacted]

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## Special Analysis

### ZIMBABWE: Prospects for Heightened Unrest

*Zimbabwe may be on the verge of increased domestic unrest. Government forces have launched a crackdown in Matabeleland, home of opposition leader Joshua Nkomo's disaffected Ndebele minority. Hardliners in Prime Minister Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union probably are behind renewed calls in the press for Nkomo's arrest and the banning of his party, the Zimbabwe African People's Union. Deteriorating economic conditions are creating further strains. Harare is increasingly concerned that Pretoria may take advantage of Zimbabwe's internal security problems.*

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The deployment last month to Matabeleland of the Army's North Korean - trained Fifth Brigade--consisting entirely of ZANU troops--has resulted in widespread excesses against civilians that will harden Ndebele resentment toward the government. Harare publicly denies Nkomo's charges that civilians have been murdered by troops, but the press [ ] indicates as many as 100 civilians have been killed and dozens injured.

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Hardliners in the cabinet have long called for Nkomo's arrest. Many are convinced he is directing much of the dissidence, despite his public disclaimers and appeals for peaceful negotiation. The press attack on Nkomo and Nkomo's public criticism of the government will further complicate reconciliation talks that are scheduled to begin this week between ZAPU and ZANU officials.

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The government also has begun its trial against two of Nkomo's former military aides on treason charges. Their release was the objective of dissidents in the unsolved kidnaping last July of two Americans and four other tourists. Although the government's case reportedly may be weak, Harare almost certainly will try to use publicity surrounding the trial to discredit further the ZAPU leadership.

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Mugabe's freedom to find a political solution to the problem is hindered by pressure from hardliners in his party. Moderates have advocated the talks with ZAPU

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and had worked to gain Mugabe's approval and his participation in a preliminary meeting with Nkomo last November. Mugabe, perhaps to assuage hardliners' fears of concessions being made to ZAPU, has appointed an outspoken critic of Nkomo to the ZANU negotiating team. [redacted]

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There also are signs the ZANU Central Committee is asserting a greater role in government decisions. The appointment of a senior black Army officer as deputy commander of the white-dominated Air Force apparently was made by the Central Committee. [redacted]

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Neither Mugabe nor any individual has full control over the party. A special police unit created by radical antiwhite Home Affairs Minister Ushewokunze has been repeatedly criticized by moderates for its undisciplined actions. [redacted]

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#### South African Involvement

Zimbabwe has publicly accused South Africa of aiding the dissidents. Zimbabwean officials suspect several sabotage incidents, including the recent destruction of construction equipment, communication links, and powerlines, were the result of covert South African operations. [redacted]

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A Zimbabwean official has said that former ZAPU guerrillas among the Zimbabwean troops sent to Mozambique to protect a key oil pipeline have been deserting and are believed to be joining with South African - backed Mozambican insurgents. Pretoria has used the insurgents to cripple Zimbabwe's economy by disrupting its vital transport and fuel links through Mozambique. [redacted]

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Although the pipeline has been open since mid-January, fuel stocks are not fully restored and more acts of sabotage could occur at any time. To alleviate popular

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discontent over scarce supplies of fuel, Harare has been seeking fuel from South Africa. It has been unwilling, however, to make political concessions demanded by Pretoria. [REDACTED]

Although Zimbabwe and South Africa recently have resumed official talks on trade, both sides have adopted inflexible positions. Zimbabwean ministers have kept up their anti - South African rhetoric and accusations about Pretoria's campaign of subversion. [REDACTED]

### Economic Pressures

The recent fuel crisis has added to Zimbabwe's other economic woes, which include a severe drought that is causing food shortages in Matabeleland and is threatening Zimbabwe's capacity to export corn. Foreign exchange shortages have forced cutbacks in crucial imports that have curtailed manufacturing output. Reduced food subsidies, a wage freeze, and an increase in the retail price of corn have added to popular discontent brought on by economic conditions. [REDACTED]

To reduce a mounting budget deficit, the cabinet recently was ordered to implement across-the-board cuts of 10 percent in spending. The Finance Minister reportedly will apply formally this week for an IMF standby agreement, which could require further unpopular austerity measures. Government ministers, meanwhile, have traveled to Matabeleland to warn of the consequences of supporting dissidents, such as the closing of schools and canceling of development projects. [REDACTED]

### Outlook

The security situation is likely to get worse in the weeks ahead, in part because of the harsher policies now being carried out. As Mugabe probably is aware, the arrest of Nkomo would risk further violence and alienation among the Ndebeles. Even the conviction of his former aides could cause wholesale desertions from the Army of Nkomo loyalists, adding to the more than 2,000 who deserted last year. [REDACTED]

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If the situation deteriorates seriously, violence could spread beyond Matabeleland and become difficult for government forces to contain. If Mugabe believes South Africa has a hand in expanded violence, he would look to the US and other Western countries to rein in Pretoria.

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